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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, \ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ( 
vs. } 
JAMES W. RODGERS, \ 
Defendant and Appellant. } 
Case No. 
8868 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in defendant's brief 
is substantially correct and fairly represents the facts in 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR FIRST DE-
GREE MURDER BASED UPON AN INFORMA-
TION FILED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
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CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH THE 
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF "MURDER 
IN THE FIRST DEGREE" FOLLOWING THE 
FILING OF A COMPLAINT CHARGING DE-
FENDANT WITH "MURDER" UPON WHICH 
A PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HAD BY 
DEFENDANT THAT RESULTED IN HIS BE-
ING BOUND OVER TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
TO STAND TRIAL FOR "MURDER" DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH NOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE 
LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO FIND-
ING. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DE-
NYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
THE INFORl\IATION MADE AT THE TIME 
OF ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE PLEA ON 
THEGROUNDSTHATTHEDEFENDANTDID 
NOT HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING ON 
THE CHARGE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER 
AND THAT THE COURT THEREFORE 'YAS 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE 
CASE. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
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QUASH THE INFORMATION OR IN LIEU 
THEREOF TO AMEND SAME TO CONFORM 
TO THE CHARGE THAT WAS MADE IN THE 
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE CHARGE 
FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS BOUND 
OVER BY THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE 
TO STAND TRIAL. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY TESTIMONY 
WITH RESPECT TO FIRST DEGREE MUR-
DER. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING 
GROUNDS: 
(A) THAT THE DEFENDANT IS IN-
SANE, AND, 
(B) THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TRY THE DE-
FENDANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN 
THE FIRST DEGREE BECAUSE THE DEFEN-
DANT WAS CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT 
WITH WHAT CONSTITUTES THE CRIME OF 
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THAT 
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THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS BASED 
UPON SAID COMPLAINT AND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS BOUND OVER BY THE 
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE TO STAND 
TRIAL FOR THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE 
COMPLAINT TO WIT: MURDER IN THE SEC-
OND DEGREE. 
POINT VI. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE VERDICT REN-
DERED IN THIS CASE IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND FURTHER THAT THE 
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE 
JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFEN-
DANT WAS NOT INSANE AND INCAPABLE 
OF CONTROLLING HIS ACTIONS BY REASON 
OF AN ORGANIC MENTAL DISORDER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR FIRST DE-
GREE MURDER BASED UPON AN INFORMA-
TION FILED BY THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
CHARGING THE DEFENDANT WITH THE 
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF "MURDER 
IN THE FIRST DEGREE" FOLLOWING THE 
FILING OF A COMPLAINT CHARGING DE-
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5 
FENDANT WITH "MURDER" UPON WHICH 
A PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS HAD BY 
DEFENDANT THAT RESULTED IN HIS BE-
ING BOUND OVER TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
TO STAND TRIAL FOR "MURDER" DID NOT 
VIOLATE THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH NOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE 
LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN SO FIND-
ING. 
Section 77-11-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides that a corn-
plaint upon which a criminal prosecution is initiated shall 
include the following: 
"77-11-1. CONTENTS.-The complaint must 
state: 
"* * * 
"(3) The general name of the crime or public 
offense. 
" ( 4) The acts or omissions complained of as 
constituting the crime or public offense named. 
* * *" 
This Court, in construing Section 8680, Comp. Laws 
Utah 1917, which was identical insofar as the above quoted 
portions of 77-11-1 are concerned, held as follows: 
"The purposes of a complaint are two-fold: To 
advise the defendant of the charge made against him 
and to enable the committing magistrate to deter-
mine whether or not the defendant should be bound 
over to the district court to stand trial for the of-
fense charged in the complaint. While a complaint 
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need not charge a crime with the fullness and par-
ticularity required in an information or indictment 
it must be in substantial compliance with the provi~ 
sions of Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 8680; * * * " 
State v. Hale, 71 U. 134, 263 P. 86. 
In an earlier case, State v. Anderson, 35 U. 496, 101 P. 
385, this Court, in interpreting identical statutory provi-
sions as those above quoted, opined thus: 
"* * * We do not understand the law to be 
that a complaint, which is made the basis of a pre-
liminary hearing before a magistrate only, must be 
drawn with the same precision and technical ac-
curacy that is required in the drawing of an indict-
ment or information upon which a party charged 
with a felony is finally brought to trial, * * *." 
The defendant cites the case of State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 
146 P. 300, in support of his position, when in fact the case 
is directly in point with the above cases. In this case the 
Court states as follows with respect to the sufficiency of 
a complaint: 
"[5, 6] Of course, the offense need not be 
stated in technical language nor in such specific 
terms as is 'required in an information or an indict-
ment. It is sufficient that the jurisdictional facts 
appear and that the crime is stated in ordinary 
language. * * *" (Emphasis added.) 
It is thus evident that this Court has given effect to 
the clear statutory language contained in Section 77-11-1, 
U. C. A. 1953. The "general name of the crime or public 
offense" is sufficient thereunder. That the term "murder" 
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as charged in a complaint is a "general" term embracing all 
statutory degrees thereof can hardly be doubted. Section 
76-30-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides as follows: 
"76-30-1. "MURDER" DEFINED.-Murder is 
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice 
aforethought." 
This is simply a codification of the common law definition 
of murder. State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P. 2d 1003. As 
such it includes all present degrees of murder and an indict-
ment for murder at common law does charge murder in the 
first degree. Davis v. Utah Territory, 151 U. S. 262, 38 L. 
Ed. 153, 14 S. Ct. 328; Green v. Commonwealth, (Supreme 
Judicial Court of Mass.), 12 Allen, 155, 170; People v. Mur-
ray, 10 California 309, 310; People v. Conroy, 97 N. Y. 62, 
70; State v. Lessing, 16 Minn. 64, 66, 67; State v. Verrill, 
54 Maine 408, 415; Gehrke v. State, 13 Texas 568, 573, 574; 
McAdams v. State, 25 Ark. 405, 416. In the Davis case the 
Supreme Court of the United States, in construing terri-
torial statutes identical with those of the State of Utah 
today, resolved the question thus, at pages 266 and 267 of 
151 U. S. Reports: 
"Other assignments of error present the objec-
tion that the indictment is so framed that it will not 
support a verdict of guilty of murder in the first 
degree. This objection is based, in part, upon the 
theory that murder in the first degree and murder 
in the second degree are made distinct, separate of-
fenses. But this is an erroneous interpretation of the 
statute. The crime defined is that of murder. The 
statute divides that crime into two classes in order 
that the punishment may be adjusted with reference 
to the presence or absence of circumstances of ag-
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gravation. And, therefore, whenever a crime is dis-
tinguished into degrees, it is left to the jury, if they 
convict the defendant, 'to find the degree of the 
crime of which he is guilty.' 2 Comp. Laws of Utah, 
715, § 5076. * * * An indictment which clearly 
and distinctly alleges facts showing a murder by the 
unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
though is good as an indictment for murder under 
the Utah statutes, although it may not indicate, upon 
its face, in terms, the degree of that crime, and 
thereby the nature of the punishment that may be 
inflicted. * * * As the acts which, under tke 
Utah statute, constitute murder, whether of tke 
highest or lowest degree, constituted murder at com-
mon law, it is clear that an indictment good at com-
mon law as an indictment for murder, in whatever 
mode or under 'Whatever circumstances of atrocity 
the crime may have been committed, is sufficient for 
any degree of the crime of murder under a statute re-
lating to murder as defined at common law, andes-
tablishing degrees of that crime in order that the 
punishment may be adapted to the special circum-
stances of each case." (Emphasis added.) 
We quote further from the Davis case at page 269, wherein 
Justice Harlan quotes from the Massachusetts case of Green 
v. Commonwealth, supra: 
" 'The reason on which these decisions were 
founded was this: that the statute establishing de-
grees of murder did not create any new offense or 
change the definition of murder as it was understood 
at common law; that the forms of indictment prev-
iously in use descriptive of murder embodied every 
shade or degree of the crime, from that which was 
most aggravated, malicious, and premeditated down 
to that which had only the element of implied malice 
in its most mitigated form; and that as the offense 
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was not changed, but only its punishment mitigated 
in certain cases, the indictment was sufficient to 
embrace every species of murder, whether it fell 
within one or the other of the degrees of homicide 
as defined by the statute. The logical and necessary 
conclusion from these discussions is, that an indict-
ment for murder at common law does charge murder 
in the first degree.'" 
We feel that the above authorities are controlling upon 
the question of whether the Legislature has created sepa-
rate crimes of first and second degree murder as contended 
by defendant, and that a complaint charging "murder" 
upon which a defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing 
and subsequently is bound over to the District Court to 
stand trial is sufficient to charge the defendant with murder 
in the first degree upon an information filed by the District 
Attorney. 
It is interesting to note that the defendant makes no 
attempt to challenge the sufficiency of the information in 
charging first degree murder upon which his conviction was 
based. And yet every case cited by defendant to support 
his position resolves itself into a determination of the suf-
ficiency of an indictment or information. 
Defendant quotes at length from the case of State v. 
Spencer, 101 U. 274, 117 P. 2d 455, rehearing denied 101 
U. 287, 121 P. 2d 912, wherein the Court held that perjury 
in the first degree and perjury in the second degree are 
distinct and separate crimes and that an information charg-
ing "perjury" does not charge a crime or public offense. 
The Court was divided 3-2 in its opinion in this case. How-
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ever, the defendant fails to point out that this decision has 
been specifically overruled by a unanimous court in the 
case of State v. Hutchinson, 4 U. 2d 404, 295 P. 2d 345. In 
this latter case, the Court, speaking through Justice Hen-
riod, stated at page 346 of 295 P. 2d: 
"Without determining the debatable question as 
to whether this language was dictum or not [in the 
Spencer case], logic would dictate that without such 
language the conclusion is almost inescapable that 
one offense was included in the other and an accu-
sation of perjury, without specifying the degree, 
would have been sufficient, since applicable statutes 
seem to say so and actually authorize charging per-
jury in the following form: 'A. B. committed per-
jury by testifying as follows.'" (Emphasis added.) 
The "applicable statutes" referred to by the Court are Sec-
tions 77-21-8, 77-21-38, and 77-21-47, U. C. A. 1953, which 
are herewith set forth: 
"77-21-8. CHARGING THE OFFENSE.-(1) 
The information or indictment may charge, and is 
valid and sufficient if it charges the offense for 
which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or 
more of the following ways: 
" (a) By using the name given to the offense 
by the common law or by a statute. 
"(b) By stating so much of the definition of 
the offense, either in terms of the common law or of 
the statute defining the offense or in terms of sub-
stantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give 
the court and the defendant notice of what offense 
is intended to be charged. 
"(2) The information or indictment may refer 
to a section or subsection of any statute creating the 
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11 
offense charged therein, and in determining the 
validity or sufficiency of such information or indict-
ment regard shall be had to such reference." 
"77-21-38. OFFENSES DIVIDED INTO DE-
GREES.-In an information or indictment for an 
offense which is divided into degrees it is sufficient 
to charge that the defendant committed the offense 
without specifying the degree." 
"77-21-47. FORMS FOR CERTAIN OFFENS-
ES.-The following forms may be used in the cases 
in which they are applicable : 
"* * * 
"Murder-A. B. murdered C. D. 
"Perjury-A. B. committed perjury by testify-
ing as follows: (set forth the testimony). * * *" 
It is apparent that this Court overruled the Spencer case in 
order to give effect to the plain language and legislative 
intent evidenced by the above statutory provisions which 
are applicable with identical effect upon either of the penal 
statutes relating to perjury or murder. By substituting the 
word "murder" in the place of "perjury" in the above 
quoted portion of the Hutchinson case we must conclude 
that even an information charging murder without specify-
ing the degree, which is not the fact of this case, would be 
sufficient under Utah law. 
In view of the above authorities we feel that this Court 
must find that the complaint filed in this case and the de-
fendant's subsequent conviction of murder in the first 
degree are not contrary to and in violation of the laws of 
the State of Utah and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
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With respect to defendant's claim that the acts com-
plained of are contrary to and in violation of Article V and 
Article VI of the Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States, let it suffice to state that the first ten amend-
ments to the Federal Constitution apply to the procedure and 
trial of causes in the federal courts and are not limitations 
on those in state courts. Gaines v. Washington, 48 S. Ct. 
468, 277 U. S. 81, 72 L. Ed. 793. And this is true in the 
case of the Fifth Amendment. Feldman v. United States 
(New York), 64 S. Ct. 1082, 322 U.S. 487, 88 L. Ed. 1408, 
154 A. L. R. 982, rehearing denied 65 S. Ct. 26, 323 U. S. 
811, 89 L. Ed. 646; Graffe v. United States, (C. C. A., 
Utah) 49 F. 2d 270, certiorari denied 52 S. Ct. 24, 284 U. 
S. 644, 76 L. Ed. 548. It is also true in the case of the Sixth 
Amendment. People v. Raffington, 98 Cal. App. 2d 455, 
220 P. 2d 967, certiorari denied 71 S. Ct. 292, 340 U.S. 912, 
95 L. Ed. 659. 
POINT II. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN DE-
NYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
THE INFORMATION MADE AT THE TIME 
OF ARRAIGNMENT AND BEFORE PLEA ON 
THE GROUNDS THAT THE DEFENDANT DID 
NOT HAVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING ON 
THE CHARGE OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER 
AND THAT THE COURT THEREFORE WAS 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE 
CASE. 
The plaintiff relies upon the argument contained under 
Point I to sustain its position that the lower court did not 
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err in denying defendant's motion to quash the information 
made at the time of arraignment and before plea upon the 
grounds that defendant did not have a preliminary hearing 
on the charge of first degree murder and that the Court 
therefore was without jurisdiction to hear the case. 
POINT III. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
QUASH THE INFORMATION OR IN LIEU 
THEREOF TO AMEND SAME TO CONFORM 
TO THE CHARGE THAT WAS MADE IN THE 
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE CHARGE 
FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS BOUND 
OVER BY THE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE 
TO STAND TRIAL. 
POINT IV. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING THE DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION TO 
THE INTRODUCTION OF ANY TESTIMONY 
WITH RESPECT TO FIRST DEGREE MUR-
DER. 
POINT V. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST 
OF JUDGMENT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING 
GROUNDS: 
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(A) THAT THE DEFENDANT IS IN-
SANE, AND, 
(B) THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO TRY THE DE-
FENDANT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER IN 
THE FIRST DEGREE BECAUSE THE DEFEN-
DANT WAS CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT 
WITH WHAT CONSTITUTES THE CRIME OF 
MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE; THAT 
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS BASED 
UPON SAID COMPLAINT AND THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS BOUND OVER BY THE 
COMMITTING MAGISTRATE TO STAND 
TRIAL FOR THE OFFENSE STATED IN THE 
COMPLAINT TO WIT: MURDER IN THE SEC-
OND DEGREE. 
The plaintiff incorporates its argument under Point 
I insofar as it relates to the sufficiency of the pleadings 
and constitutional rights and guarantees of the defendant 
in answer to Points III, IV and V contained in defendant's 
brief. 
POINT VI. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVER-
RULING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL IN THAT THE VERDICT REN-
DERED IN THIS CASE IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND FURTHER THAT THE 
EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT FOR THE 
JURY TO CONCLUDE THAT THE DEFEN-
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DANT WAS NOT INSANE AND INCAPABLE 
OF CONTROLLING HIS ACTIONS BY REASON 
OF AN ORGANIC MENTAL DISORDER. 
Defendant contends that the evidence introduced at 
his trial is uncontradicted that he was acting under an 
irresistible impulse produced by mental disease and, there-
fore, the defense of insanity, as a matter of law, is avail-
able to him under the doctrine established in State v. Green, 
78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177. Defendant relies solely upon testi-
mony to the effect that upon two separate Kolmer Compli-
ment Fixation tests, a form of spinal serology for syphilis, 
upon which positive reactions of three plus and two plus 
were obtained in tests made upon defendant, as proof of 
organic syphilitic infection of his central nervous system. 
Upon this evidence he attempts to establish that he acted 
under an irresistible impulse resulting from a mental dis-
ease. Such was the expert opinion testimony of Doctors 
John Landward and Craig Nelson, both of whom testified 
on defendant's behalf. 
In addition to the spinal fluid tests referred to above, 
two separate samples of defendant's blood were subjected 
to four separate tests for syphilis, namely the V. D. R. L. 
(used by the Venereal Disease Laboratory of the U.S. Pub-
lic Health Service), Kahn Standard, Hinton, and Kolmar 
Compliment Fixation tests, all of which were negative, or 
non-reactive (R. 309-310, 318-319). Defendant's witness 
Dr. Chester B. Powell, a specialist in the field of neurology 
and neuro-surgery, in commenting upon the opposite results 
t obtained in the tests made upon defendant's spinal fluid 
(\. and blood, testified that "About three percent on the aver-
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age of patients with syphilis of the nervous system will 
show a negative blood serology" (R. 324). Furthermore, he 
testified that the defendant "doesn't have any prominent 
clinical signs of syphilis" (R. 325). He also mentioned the 
possibility of a "false positive" spinal fluid test reaction but 
noted that this is "exceedingly rare", and, after ruling out 
the known causes of false positive serology, concluded that 
the defendant was suffering from syphilitic infection of 
the centrol nervous system (R. 325-326). Upon cross ex-
amination he admitted that his interview with the defen-
dant did not reveal any abnormality as to judgment, mem-
ory and other intellectual functions nor did his electro en-
cephalograph test of the defendant indicate any abnormal-
ity of the brain wave pattern (R. 330-331). Dr. Powell also 
testified that persons may have syphilis of the brain and 
be "perfectly responsible" without necessarily acting under 
hallucinations, and most such patients do know the differ-
ence between right and wrong, and such a condition doesn't 
mean that the individual doesn't know the nature of his 
acts ( R. 332-333) . He also testified that upon questioning 
the defendant, the latter had stated that he had never had 
syphilis nor been treated for it (R. 333). And that the 
patient had no signs of congenital spyhilis (R. 334). 
The above noted evidence is representative of what 
defendant terms "uncontradicted evidence" that the defen-
dant was suffering from an organic mental disease which 
rendered him insane and incapable of controlling his ac-
tion~. This Court is asked to hold, as a matter of law, that 
a :v.;., possibility (syphilis diagnosis upon positive spinal 
fluid tc~t and negative blood test) constituted uncontra--
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dieted evidence of organic disease in defendant's central 
nervous system such that he could not suppress an irresist-
ible impulse, and that the jury could not give credence to 
the following : 
1. The 97% norm of diagnosis (spinal fluid test and 
blood test confirming each other) , 
2. The absence of clinical signs of syphilis in defen-
dant, 
3. The possibility of a "false positive" spinal fluid 
test reaction, 
4. The lack of any observed abnormalities in the realm 
of judgment, memory and other intellectual functions evi-
denced by defendant's behavior, 
5. The failure of the electro encephalograph test to 
reveal any brain wave abnormality in defendant, 
6. The probability that, even assuming organic dis-
ease of the central nervous system, the afflicted individual 
does know right from wrong, does know the nature of his 
actions and does not necessarily act under hallucinations, 
7. The defendant's own statements to the above wit-
ness that he had never had syphilis nor been treated for it, 
and 
8. The absence of any signs of congenital syphilis in 
the defendant. 
We do not think the Court will so hold. It certainly re-
quired no stretch of the imagination for this jury to find 
from the above medical testimony contrary to the defen-
:C dant's position, nor could it be said that such a finding was 
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unsupported by evidence. And it should be here noted that 
this is evidence adduced from the defendant's own witness. 
We shall hereafter examine the sufficiency of additional 
evidence to support the verdict in this case. 
Defendant relies heavily upon the expert opinion testi-
mony of Dr. John Landward, a clinical psychologist, who 
performed a series of tests upon the defendant such as the 
Bender-Gesthalt Motor Test (figure reproduction), the 
Wexler Bell view Adult Intelligence Scale Test (block de-
sign), and the Rorschach Ink Blot Test (image perception), 
from which he ascertained certain sensitivity which, in his 
opinion, was an indication of some brain damage in the 
defendant (R. 341-346). As a result of these tests Dr. 
Landward recommended that the defendant be given an 
E. E. G. (electro encephalogram), presumably as a reliable 
procedure to confirm his findings (R. 343). As we have 
discussed earlier, the electro encephalograph test made upon 
the defendant did not indicate any brain impairment (R. 
330-331) . Furthermore, Dr. Landward recognized a slight 
possibility of an individual being able to falsify his re-
sponses so as to obtain a certain test result by design (R. 
355). And most important, this witness recognized the ele-
ment of human error, and particularly his own, to be reck-
oned with under these test procedures (R. 358). Again 
we emphasize that the defendant's claim of "uncontradicted 
evidence" does not hold even in the case of his own wit-
nesses. It was properly within the province of this jury 
to consider the opinions of these expert witnesses with due 
regard for each exception, qualification, conflict or incon-
sistency contained therein. And this Court should not upset 
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the verdict of the jury where the evidence is so clearly 
capable of divergent interpretation as that involved herein. 
Another witness for the defendant, Dr. Craig Nelson, 
a psychiatrist, also testified that it was his opinion that 
the defendant acted under an irresistible impulse as the 
result of a paranoid and psychotic personality aggravated 
by an organic infection of the central nervous system (R. 
366-368). He based this opinion upon observations of 
slurred speech and methodical rigidness of speech ( perse-
veration) evidenced by defendant's verbal interview with 
him considered in connection with the positive reaction of 
the spinal fluid tests (R. 361, 363, 370). Upon cross exam-
ination, Doctor Nelson admitted that slurring of speech 
doesn't necessarily indicate brain infection (R. 369). Thus 
it is evident that the spinal fluid tests were of primary 
importance to this doctor's opinion. The uncertainties sur-
rounding the conclusiveness of these tests in diagnosing 
syphilis have heretofore been discussed, and the jury cer-
tainly had the right to consider all aspects of the evidence 
in its evaluation. Furthermore, there is a manifest incon-
sistency between the testimony of Dr. Nelson and Dr. Powell 
-the former relying upon claimed abnormalities observed 
in the defendant's behavior for his opinion, and the latter 
claiming that there were "no clinical signs of syphilis" in 
defendant's behavior and that his interview with the de-
fendant did not reveal any abnormality as to judgment and 
intellectual functions. Can there be any question that the 
jury had the absolute right to resolve this conflict and to 
determine the credibility of these witnesses in this matter? 
Again we point out to the Court that the above inconsis-
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tencies and uncertainties have arisen from the testimony 
of defendant's own witnesses. 
In addition to the above, the jury had the testimony 
of Dr. William D. Pace, a psychiatrist, who was called by 
the State as a rebuttal witness, to consider in arriving at 
its verdict. Dr. Pace testified that, as a result of his psy-
chiatric examination of the defendant, it was his opinion 
that the defendant was not mentally ill or psychotic (R. 
37 4) . And that he was not suffering from a mental disease, 
but rather his actions represented abnormal personality 
traits or character traits (R. 375). In answer to the hypo-
thetical question concerning the conditions under which the 
shooting occurred, Dr. Pace testified that, in his opinion, the 
defendant did know right from wrong, that he did know the 
nature of the act he was doing and that he did not control 
his impulses but this was not the result of mental disease 
(R. 375-378). Upon cross examination by defendant's coun-
sel, Dr. Pace testified that his examination of the defendant 
did not reveal any organic disorder and that he observed 
nothing unusual about the defendant's speech, nor did the 
personal history given by the defendant indicate that his 
behavior since childhood was the result of syphilis (R. 380-
382). 
The defendant takes the position that no conflict ex-
ists between the testimony of Dr. Pace and his own expert 
witnesses primarily on the ground that Dr. Pace allegedly 
made no inquiry into the possibility of an organic mental 
disease. In answer to this point we quote the following 
from line 30, page 280, to line 15, page 281 of the record 
on appeal: 
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"Q. Well, did you when you examined Mr. 
Rodgers here, did you find any evidence at all of 
any organic disorder? 
"A. No I didn't. 
"Q. Did you notice any slurring of speech, for 
example, which might have shown you that he ~as 
inarticulate and that he couldn't talk properly which 
might indicate an organic disorder? 
"A. I didn't notice anything unusual about his 
speech. He talked very freely. 
"Q. He talked freely, but I meant by that did 
you notice any slurring of the words that he used? 
"A. I didn't notice any. 
"Q. Was there anything else that was brought 
out in your examination that would indicate any 
possibility of organic trouble in this man's mind? 
"A. No, I saw nothing whatever that would 
indicate organic changes in the central nervous sys-
tem." (Emphasis added.) 
In answer to defendant's claim that Dr. Pace's exam-
ination was perfunctory, superficial and without sufficient 
inquiry into the condition of the defendant, we bring to 
the Court's attention that his examination of two hours 
duration (R. 374) exceeded the time consumed by Dr. Nel-
son in his examination of defendant by one-half hour, (R. 
360) and equalled the time spent by Dr. Landward in his 
interview with the defendant (R. 353). There is no claim 
made by defendant that Dr. Pace was not qualified to make 
~ a psychiatric examination of equal dignity with that of his 
1: own expert witnesses. His only complaint is that Dr. Pace 
W did not agree with his witnesses. This is not sufficient to 
~~ allow collateral attack upon the unwanted testimony. We 
think the above recital clearly indicates a conflict of opinion 
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between the defendant's expert witnesses and the plaintiff's 
rebuttal witness, in addition to the conflicts inherent in the 
testimony of defendant's own witnesses as heretofore set 
forth. Where there is a conflict of evidence, a verdict can-
not be reversed upon appeal on the ground that it is not 
supported by evidence. Lee v. New York Life Insurance 
Co., 95 U. 445, 82 P. 2d 178. It was also held in the Lee 
case that it is for the jury to decide a question upon which 
expert witnesses disagree. This is in accord with the gen-
eral rule that the value of conflicting expert testimony is 
not determined by the numerical weight thereof. Simonet 
v. Frank F. Pellissier & Sons, 61 Cal. App. 2d 41, 141 P. 2d 
922; Appeal of City of Pittsburg, 350 Pa. 421, 39 A. 2d 601; 
Monark Battery Co. v. Industrial Commission, 354 Ill. 494, 
188 N. E. 413; Putnam v. Murden, 97 Ind. App. 313, 184 
N. E. 796; Ferguson v. Department of Labor and In-
dustries of U'ashington, 197 Wash. 524, 85 P. 2d 1072, re-
versed on other grounds 90 P. 2d 280; Ramberg v. Morgan, 
209 Iowa 474, 218 N. ,V. 492. In the Simonet case the jury 
chose to accept the medical testimony of plaintiff's single 
expert witness instead of the medical evidence introduced 
by the defendant's five expert witnesses. In sustaining the 
right of the jury to so decide the court stated as follows, 
at page 924, 141 P. 2d Reporter: 
"* * * As to the probative value of such 
testimony, there can be no significance attached ~o 
the fact that the score was five to one. The court lS 
not bound to decide in conformity with the declara-
tions of anr number of witnesses, which do not 
produce conviction in the mind of the court, agai~ 
a }pss number or against a presumption or other evi-
dence * * * " 
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In addition to the medical testimony in this case, it is 
clear that the defendant acted in the most deliberate and 
premeditated manner. Contrary to defendant's allegation 
that he acted under an "irresistible impulse" or "delusion" 
the plaintiff submits that defendant's actions in securing 
the murder weapon and his calmly smoking a cigarette as 
he awaited the filling of a dump truck from a power shovel 
operated by his intended victim, after which he shot once 
into the ground and motioned to his victim to come down 
from his position on the shovel and then repeatedly shot 
his victim to death, indicate that this killing was not the 
result of "impulsive" action or "delusions" (R. 135-140, 
160-161, 167, 173, 179-183, 200-201, 218-219). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's appeal in this case should be denied and 
the verdict and judgment of the District Court in this mat-
ter should be affirmed upon the following grounds : 
1. The conviction of defendant for first degree murder 
upon an information filed by the District Attorney charg-
ing the commission by defendant of the crime of "murder 
in the first degree", following the filing of a complaint and 
preliminary hearing upon the charge of murder did not 
violate the laws of the State of Utah, the Constitution of 
the State of Utah nor the Constitution of the United States 
~ of America. 
2. The lower court did not err in denying defendant's 
motion to quash the information. 
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3. The lower court did not err in overruling the de-
fendant's motion to quash the information or, in lieu there-
of, to amend the information to conform to the charge as 
made in the original complaint. 
4. The lower court did not err in overruling the de-
fendant's objection to the introduction of any testimony 
with respect to first degree murder. 
5. The lower court did not err in overruling defen-
dant's motion in arrest of judgment. 
6. The lower court did not err in overruling defen-
dant's motion for a new trial in that the verdict is sup-
ported by the evidence which was sufficient for the jury 
to conclude that the defendant was not insane and incapable 
of controlling his actions by reason of an organic mental 
disease. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
JACK L. CRELLIN, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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